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and moon. Demonology is the shadow of theology; the whole world is an omen and a sign. Why look so wistfully in a corner? Man is the image of God. These adepts have mistaken flatulency for inspiration. Were this drivel which they report as the voice of spirits really such, we must find out a more decisive suicide. I say to the table-rappers: —

“I well believe
Thou wilt not utter what thou dost not know,
And so far will I trust thee, gentle Kate.”

They are ignorant of all that is healthy and useful to know, and by law of kind, — dunces seeking dunces in the dark of what they call the spiritual world, — preferring snores and gastric noises to the voice of any muse. I think the rappings a new test, like blue litmus or other chemical absorbent, to try catechisms with. It detects organic scepticism in the very heads of the Church.

’T is a lawless world. We have left the geometry, the compensation, and the conscience of the daily world, and come into the realm or chaos of chance, and pretty or ugly confusion; no guilt and no virtue, but a droll bedlam, where everybody believes only after his humor, and the actors and spectators have no conscience or reflection, no police, no foot-rule, no sanity, — nothing but whim and whim creative.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON.

ART. III. — CHRISTIAN POLICY IN TURKEY.

THE attitude of Turkey in the presence of Europe has been so completely changed by the diplomatic events of the past three months, and the Eastern question is passing through phases so little anticipated by those Powers most deeply interested in its solution, that any effort at this stage to unravel its mysteries, or to analyze the causes which have contributed to create them, may seem somewhat premature; while, if the future has in store for us as many surprises as the past, we may certainly be excused for not attempting to predict them. And yet, when a year ago it became evident that the Eastern problem was once more about to engage the attention of the Christian Powers, it would have

been reasonable to assume that, inasmuch as the political conditions of Europe had undergone great changes since 1856, when it was fondly hoped that the question had been set at rest forever, an entirely different set of combinations was inevitable, involving political considerations altogether novel. At the close of the Crimean War, France divided with England the prestige in the East, which was the consequence of the defeat of Russia. Austria was the leading power of Central Europe, and claimed a control over the German element, while it successfully resisted the Panslavonic policy of Russia. Italy was not then in existence as a European power; Prussia had not then discovered its Bismarck; Turkey, heretofore known as "the sick man," was supposed to have had new life infused into his veins, and Russia to be depleted by the long struggle to which she had been exposed. When after an interval of twenty years Europe found itself brought once more face to face with the Eastern question, not only had these conditions been fundamentally changed by the events which had transpired during the interval, but the question was presented in a new form. It did not arise out of an obscure dispute in Syria, which was eagerly seized upon by the French and Russian Emperors to advance their own special political ends, but it forced itself upon reluctant Europe as the result of the declaration of war by a vassal State against the sovereign Power, and, though a purely internal question, was attended by incidents which appealed so strongly to the sympathies of the Powers which were committed by the treaty of 1856, in certain eventualities, to internal interference in the affairs of Turkey, as to render it impossible for them to remain unmoved spectators. Excepting Russia, however, no European government had any interest in disturbing the settlement which had been arrived at in 1856, while the changes which had taken place in the general balance of power upon the continent rendered it extremely difficult to foresee the immediate effect of this new complication.

The consequence was, that a very strong tendency was manifested on the part of all to concur in any scheme which should offer any hope of a peaceful solution of the difficulty, consistently with a fair prospect of redressing the evils in the internal administration of Turkey which the Christian Powers considered themselves under obligations to remedy. The three countries whose political interests

were more directly involved were Russia, Austria, and England. Hence it was assumed that any policy advocated by any one of those Powers in the interest of the Christian population of Turkey would not conflict with what was supposed to be the national interest of the Power proposing it. When the British government refused to concur in the Berlin memorandum its refusal was at once attributed to hostility and distrust, instead of to the defects inherent in the scheme which it contained. For the same reason it was assumed that Russia, equally well assured that any attempt to carry out its provisions must result in the failure it desired, had agreed to it. There can be no doubt that at this time nothing was more foreign to the designs of Russia than a war in the East. She saw, in the rejection by the British government of the Berlin memorandum, in the presence of the fleet in Besika Bay, in the financial operations of England in Egypt, and in the creation of an imperial title for the Queen in India, unmistakable signs of what is generally known as a "vigorous foreign policy" on the part of the present administration, and she earnestly desired to avert a crisis which might involve her in war with England, and to continue rather to pursue that system of disintegration by means of protectorate privileges, which is the safer and more economical mode employed by Christian nations for acquiring the territories of people professing other religions. It has been by the successful prosecution of this policy that she has been enabled during the present century so widely to extend her frontiers. Had the British government been able to maintain the position which it had determined to adopt, of a rigid adherence to the treaty of 1856, and of resistance to any attempt on the part of Russia to destroy the independence of Turkey by the imposition of guaranties or undue interference in her internal affairs, it is evident that, as a friend and ally of the Sultan, and responsible before Europe for the due performance on her part of the pledges of the reformed administration which were stipulated for in that treaty, England was in the most favorable position for insisting, in return for her good offices in protecting the Porte from the aggressive designs of Russia, that the grievances of the Christian population should be redressed in a manner satisfactory to the Christian Powers. Subsequent events have clearly proved that had the British government been allowed to pursue this policy untrammelled by popular

demonstrations, and the pressure of a public opinion governed by passion instead of reason, the Christians in Turkey would have been spared the horrors of the war which now threatens them with ruin and their country with desolation, and a decided amelioration in their condition would have been assured to them. The effect of all considerations of policy having been swept away before a wave of sentiment has been, as might have been expected, to produce all the contingencies least desired. By a singular fatality it has happened that on both occasions, when that party which claims an exclusive devotion to peace and to the interests of humanity have put themselves prominently forward in Eastern complications, they have precipitated war and been the indirect means of producing an infinite amount of human misery. It is now well known that had not the Emperor Nicholas been encouraged by the peace utterances in England of those who condemned the Crimean War, he would never have so far committed himself to hostilities with Turkey as to make retreat impossible; and now, in spite of this warning, the same note is sounded in England with the same results in Russia, and the consequence is, the declaration on the part of the Czar of a war-policy so defiant, and of warlike demonstrations so compromising, that there seems no escape from the dilemma in which he is placed of invading the Ottoman dominions, or of incurring a loss of personal dignity and national prestige more humiliating than a military disaster.

The curious effect of this spasmodic outburst of popular philanthropy in England has thus been to force every government concerned into a false and unexpected position. The government of England was compelled to abandon the policy which would have secured a peaceful solution of the question for the policy of the masses, which was based upon the fundamental fallacy that if Turkey was threatened with isolation by all Europe she would yield. As no responsibility attaches to popular conferences or public meetings, no provision was made for the opposite contingency, and the government was driven into negotiations which, it was plain to every one conversant with the Turkish character, must end in failure, without having had an opportunity of concerting with the European powers beforehand on a definite policy to be pursued in the event of any such failure. Hence the unexpected resistance of Turkey produced that chaotic condition of affairs which has placed Chris-

tendom in the undignified position it now occupies. In consequence of this sudden reversal of British policy, the singular spectacle was presented to Europe of a special envoy repairing to Constantinople to carry out instructions diametrically opposed to the utterances of the head of the government. And Lord Beaconsfield's distinct announcement that it was the intention of the government to maintain the treaty of 1856 was followed shortly after by Lord Salisbury's ordering the British fleet to leave Besika Bay, because the Sultan would not consent to see that treaty practically violated. A change of front in an opposite sense was in the same manner forced still more suddenly on the Czar. That potentate had declared publicly, that if "Turkey did not concede to Europe the guaranties she had a right to demand he would act independently"; but it is evident from what transpired that almost immediately afterwards he sent instructions to General Ignatieff to concede those guaranties. The Russian and English Ambassadors thus had their "parts" reversed, and the amazed Ottoman found his English friend as bitterly enforcing the obnoxious demands of Russia, as his Muscovite enemy was gracefully waiving them, while Germany and Austria, finding England unexpectedly ranged with Russia, covertly assumed an attitude at the conference by no means in sympathy with those two Powers. It now became apparent that the Porte was not likely to yield, and that if it did not, British philanthropists had dragged both the Russian government and their own into a trap which might involve the former in disaster, and could certainly reflect no credit on the latter, while the cause of the Christian was by no means satisfactorily advanced; and, more galling than all, that the conference itself which was based on this policy of humanity, would result in a diplomatic triumph for the ferocious and sanguinary Turk. Such, in fact, has proved the case. Thus it often happens that it is not always those whose motives are the purest who are gifted with the largest amount of common-sense or are most successful in their undertakings in this world.

An episode so extraordinary and unprecedented in the history of diplomacy as that which resulted from the popular movement in England could not but have its effect upon the other governments of Europe. Austria, which was most deeply interested, became for a time simply paralyzed. As it was impossible for

her leading statesmen to know what resolutions were likely to be carried tumultuously at the next public meeting which might be called in England for the purpose of directing its foreign policy, they maintained a discreet silence; but that they anticipated and probably to some extent intentionally contributed to the fiasco at Constantinople may be gathered from the tone of the diplomacy of Vienna since that event, and from its veiled attitude of hostility to Russia. In Berlin Prince Bismarck made it clear to those who could read between the lines of his speech, that he would abstain from interference in the Eastern question so long as the powers chiefly interested continued to bungle it, but that he intended to settle it after his own fashion when their mistakes afforded him the necessary opportunity. In the mean time he would refrain from informing the world what the policy of Germany might be, — a sentiment which the country has fully indorsed.*

France and Italy, while they were as much confounded as other European nations by the novel turn thus given to affairs, had no choice left them but to follow suit and wait the turn of events; and the result of the conference and the somewhat undignified position in which all those who have taken part in it have been placed, will not encourage them to rely in delicate diplomatic questions upon the popular programme as the one most likely to insure the desired result. The lesson, however, is too valuable a

* We find the liberal members of the Reichstag contrasting as follows the British and the German methods of diplomacy: —

“A neighboring country” (England), says Herr Lasker, “has been arrested in the pursuit of its policy by powerful popular agitations, and, as we now see, not to its advantage. It is not from want of interest there that we refrain from public discussions of public affairs, but because we are aware that civilization will have to make one stride more ere the people will be able, except in perfectly clear cases, to interfere with the conduct of public affairs; we will spare the country exciting debates which cannot better the situation at all, because we feel, I repeat, firm confidence in the policy of the Chancellor.”

“Gentlemen,” said another orator on the same occasion, also a liberal, “we feel no craving for such people’s meetings as the English have assembled. If you, gentlemen, feel such a craving, then you should not tell us to summon such meetings, but have the goodness to hold them yourselves. We even promise to make our appearance there and listen to you. What have the English gained by these meetings? They have made the course of English policy to a certain degree unstable and exercised an influence which can certainly not be called a useful one. I warn you most decidedly against this example. Let us conduct German politics in the German way.”

one to pass over without inquiring how it came to pass that the effort made by England to force the will of Christendom upon Turkey was doomed from the first to failure.

Those organs of public opinion in England, and the speakers who led the agitation against the original policy of the government, as a rule showed very little knowledge of the local conditions. This was not to be wondered at, as a very short time elapsed between the Bulgarian atrocities which evoked the movement, and the policy which its leaders were prepared to lay down; but it is not every Christian who knows how to deal with a Mahometan, even after he has seen and known him, and as the great majority of those who attended the public meetings had never either done one or the other, their views of how most successfully to act upon him were necessarily somewhat vague. The treatment of this question, however, involved not merely an intimate acquaintance with Moslem modes of thought generally, but a political knowledge of Turkey as a government, and finally — what is still more rare — a familiarity with the administrative difficulties with which it has to contend in Europe.

It is scarcely possible for the ordinary Christian to realize the contempt which a Mahometan feels for him from a moral point of view. In the same manner the Mahometan cannot comprehend that sublime assumption of superiority which the Christian feels for those who are backward in the arts of commerce or mechanical appliances. To the Mahometan, civilization means religious fanaticism, — to the Christian, it means material progress, not unmingled with religious scepticism.

The Mahometan sees that in the degree in which the Christian prospers in the things of this world, does he seem to lose his faith in the things which pertain to the next. In other words, Christians who have grown rich would rarely, in the opinion of a Turk, be ready to sacrifice all on a religious ground. On the other hand, the Christian who is prosperous, and has much to lose by war, does not realize that the Turk, not having the faculty of amassing wealth, has seldom much to lose, and even if he had, is still too much of a religious fanatic to cling to it at the expense of his religion. Hence Christian nations, just in the degree in which they are rich and prosperous, shrink from war, while Moslem communities are not similarly affected. At the same time the latter occasionally over-

estimate the inordinate selfishness (as they consider it) of Christians. For instance, in the late conference, they could scarcely believe that Great Britain could so far forget her national interests as to plunge into a policy disastrous to them, upon purely sentimental grounds. Thus the agitation in England, though it failed diplomatically, may have had the effect of showing Mahometans that there was a large mass of Christians in England who were either lacking in political intelligence or could be moved by other sentiments than those of pure self-interest. The desire expressed by one leading British statesman to see Russia in Constantinople in order to have a better government established there, and of another prominent speaker who hoped that "India might perish rather than England should strike a blow in a cause which was not just," must have seemed to the Turk such an outburst of fanaticism as his whole soul could respond to, or, considering the impression he may have formed of British government in India, on information obtained from Moslem sources, it might have seemed to him hypocrisy. It is the difficulty of reconciling the professions of Christian nations with their practice, which inspires him with such a boundless confidence in what he feels to be his own moral superiority. If his religion tells him to slay, he slays remorselessly, and he maintains that he does so with no more barbarity and far more consistency than the Christians did who were commanded by General Kauffman to exterminate Tartar hordes in Central Asia, or by the Russian General Suwaroff, who within the memory of man put 38,860 men, women, and children to death at the siege of Ismail. In the eyes of the Mahometan these butcheries were quite inexcusable, because they were not done on any religious principle, whereas he feels he is as much justified in slaughtering by Divine command in Bulgaria as was the Joshua of old in Canaan, whose acts of a similar nature both Christians and Mahometans consider sacred.

Thus it has come about that the Christian and the Turk have a very confused notion in regard to the moral standard by which they are respectively governed. The religious motives, for instance, alleged by Europe as a justification of its interference in the Mahometan system of government, inspires the latter with the most profound contempt, because he believes them to be simply a disguise under which the great Powers can more conveniently carry out their political designs, and behind which they can veil their mutual jealousies.

The spectacle of a Protestant and Catholic nation in 1854 eagerly rushing to battle to protect Mahometans against the onslaught of another Christian Power, and of one of those same nations in 1876 carried away by a burst of Christian sentiment so vehement that they outdo their old enemy in their anti-Mahometan zeal, produces a profound scepticism in the Turkish mind as to the real motive which is animating its policy. When, in addition to this, Russia is found constituting herself the champion of the Slavonic race, and at the same time crushing the Slavs of Poland more cruelly than the Turk has crushed the Slavs of Bulgaria;* when Jews are constrained to flee to the Mahometan provinces of Turkey as an asylum from the persecutions to which they are subjected by the Christian governments of Roumania and Servia, and the remonstrances of the Turkish government that the latter state should grant to Catholic Christians and Jews the same civil rights that members of the Greek Church enjoy, prove unavailing; when the Montenegrins, who are Christians, habitually cut off the lips and noses of the Turkish soldiers whom they capture in warfare; when there is abundant evidence that the insurrectionary propaganda, which is unceasingly active in Turkey, is mainly kept alive by the money and efforts of Pan-Slavonic Christians who sometimes in the disguise of Turks plunder and pillage their co-religionists, thus achieving the twofold object of enriching themselves and stimulating the hatred of the Christian against the Mussulman;† when hordes of Russian volunteers in the uniform of the regular army pour into Turkish territory to swell the ranks of a rebel force, in open violation of international law as laid down by the Christian Powers at Geneva, without remonstrance on the part of those Powers; when petitions pour in on the Sultan from the Mahometan populations of Russia, applying for protection against the persecution of the Czar,‡ — when, in a word, the Turk's experience of Christian nations is that they are utterly unprincipled in the political combinations which they make against Turkey for their

* Polish refugees in Turkey are constantly assuring the Turks that this is the fact, and it is to some extent warranted by my own observation in Poland during the insurrection of 1863, and by the details given in an able pamphlet by Mr. Alfred Austin, entitled "Russia before Europe."

† A disguised band of this description was captured on one occasion on the Servian frontier while I was at Belgrade.

‡ See "Times," of January 26, 1877.

own interested ends, that they are in some instances as barbarous in warfare, in others as intolerant in religion,* and in others as corrupt and oppressive in their internal administration as they accuse him of being, he arrives at a curious, but not altogether surprising conclusion. Strange as it may seem to us, many Mussulmans, especially among the religious classes at Constantinople, are firmly convinced that the Christian Powers are not religious Powers at all in the sense in which the Ottoman Power is religious, while their idea of individual Christians is that their only God is Mammon, — a notion principally derived from the extreme facility with which Christians in Turkey manage to transfer Mahometan money into Christian pockets. Hence these fanatics have created for themselves the singular illusion, that the consistency and piety of the Turkish government is a standing reproach to the Christian Powers, and that their real reason for wishing to expel the Mahometans from Europe is not because the latter refuse to imitate

* The Russian St. Petersburg "Gazette," in an article on the Russian Church, observes that the number of dissenters in Russia has very much increased of late, especially among the masses of the population, and that even in the higher classes of society the mystical doctrines of fashionable preachers and the manifestations of "Spiritualists" have undermined the influence of the orthodox clergy. This is certainly not due to any excessive tolerance by the government of sectarianism, for "the state could not do more to support orthodoxy than it does, unless it adopted a system of intolerance like that practised in the Middle Ages." The writer next enumerates the laws which are now in force for the protection of the state Church in Russia. "If a member of the orthodox Church changes his religion, both he and the person who instigated him to do so are punished. When the adopted religion is a non-Christian one, the instigator is punished with hard labor; when it is the Roman Catholic or a Protestant faith, he is banished; and when it is that of a Russian sect, he is 'interned.' As for the person who leaves the orthodox Church, he is in every case placed at the disposal of the ecclesiastical authorities for suitable correction, and his property is sequestrated. Members of the orthodox Church are forbidden to marry non-Christians, and the children of mixed marriages (except only in the Baltic provinces) are bound, under severe penalties, to be brought up in the orthodox religion. The right of propagating religious doctrines is possessed exclusively by the state Church; the members of other religions are not even allowed to convert pagans to Christianity. The establishment of new religious communities, too, is strictly forbidden. And yet, though the state thus protects the orthodox Church, the latter is daily losing ground in the Empire. It is not the fault of the state that, notwithstanding such severe protective laws, the Tchouvashes, Tcheremisses, and other alien races are being converted in masses to Mahometanism; that whole villages which were regarded as orthodox are now found to be Mahometan; that the Mahometan propaganda is rapidly spreading northward, while the orthodox propaganda finds but few supporters."

the virtues of Christian nations, but because they altogether repudiate their vices. And they therefore feel doubly indignant with Christians for using their religion as a bond of union to justify an interference in the affairs of a Mahometan country which they never presume to exercise amongst themselves. In other words, if the Sultan were a Christian instead of a Mahometan, they believe that the Christian Powers would have no excuse for combining to impose their own administrative schemes upon him, no matter what the nature of his government might be.

I do not for a moment mean to offer any opinion as to whether the Turk is in any degree justified by the facts in entertaining these opinions either of Christian governments or of Christian individuals. That he does entertain them, no one who knows him can doubt, and one great source of the strength and self-confidence which he has manifested in the present struggle has arisen from the conviction which he possesses, that a religious government must always triumph over those which, in his opinion, practically have no religion. Had the leaders of the popular policy in England realized this fact, they would not have harped with such pertinacity upon the theme that if Europe were united the Turk would give way demoralized before it. The stupendous blunder into which they fell is a curious illustration of the incompetence of the masses in a Christian country to comprehend to what an extent a strong religious belief may govern the policy of a whole nation, even in the presence of great risks and sacrifices.

The next idea which these gentlemen failed to grasp was that even supposing that in the opinion of the Porte the example of the Christian nations in matters of administration was such as to warrant them in proposing a scheme of reform, any such scheme in order to be acceptable must be applicable to the whole Empire, and not merely to a part. Indeed, the first utterances of leading men in England were not calculated to induce the Sultan to listen favorably to schemes of any kind, such, for instance, as the proposal of Mr. Gladstone that he should be turned out of Europe "bag and baggage." Only about one quarter of the Mahometans in Europe are pure Osmanlis, the remaining three fourths are Europeans by descent, whether Slavs, Bulgars, Greeks, or Albanians. The expulsion of the Turk from Europe means, therefore, the transferring of the Mahometan population — which is indigenous to the

soil, and compose, in fact the aristocratic and proprietary element in the country — to a government which, if it is to be Christian, must be taken from the rural classes. It is, to say the least, a singular way of recommending the Christian religion to the Sultan, to announce to him that it justifies the Powers professing it to engage in a bloody war for the purpose of forcibly expelling him and his whole race from a country they have occupied for five hundred years, because they do not approve of his system of government. This doctrine would hardly suit the citizens of the United States, who have not “camped” in the lands of the Indian nearly so long as the Turk has in the lands of the Slav.

Apart, however, from the moral aspect of the question, which is one which people can generally only see through their own spectacles, the idea that the expulsion of the Turk from Europe would facilitate the solution of the problem of good government in Turkey, is another of those fallacies upon which the Eastern policy of the British public is based. For the question would then arise, Who is to govern the two millions and a half of European Mahometans, composing the dominant class, who are left? I have been the guest in their own konaks of some of these Mahometan Beys in Bosnia, and I feel convinced that they would resist to the last any attempt to turn their serfs into their masters. Though of the same race, and speaking the same language, often in fact not knowing a word of Turkish, they are fanatic in their faith, warlike in their habits, and possess all the prestige which must always attach to the hereditary lords of the soil; and one great difficulty which the government at Constantinople finds in attempting to inaugurate reforms in these provinces is, that this Slav aristocracy resent any attempt on the part of the Turks to interfere in their relations with the peasantry, which are no doubt arbitrary and oppressive. The insurrection of the Slav Christians is quite as much directed against their Slav masters as against the Turkish government, quite as much agrarian as religious. If we can imagine Ireland coterminous with a vast and powerful Celtic empire bitterly hostile to England, constantly carrying on an active Pan-Celtic and Catholic propaganda among the Catholic peasantry, and finally combining with all other Catholic countries to insist that England should permit a foreign military occupation in Ireland to guarantee Home rule and other reforms, the exact nature of

which were specified, and further threatening that in case of such reforms not being satisfactorily forced upon a bigoted Orange aristocracy, England might find herself at war with Catholic Europe, we may form some idea of the alternative now being presented to the Porte, and of the reason of the Porte's resolute resistance. No Englishman would for a moment admit that any foreign Power, however well informed, could possibly propose measures of reform for Ireland, which would satisfactorily solve the problems that exist there now, and which are simple compared with those with which Turkey has to deal, much less would he consent to such measures being decided upon at a preliminary conference in London, from which British representatives were excluded. That the proposals made at the Conference were most superficially considered, may be gathered from the readiness with which they were abandoned, dwindling down in a week from military occupation, total disarmament, and numerous other elaborate contrivances in the shape of guaranties, to an International commission and the sanction of the appointment of governors for five years. Apart, however, from their inherent impracticability, even locally considered, they possessed the fatal defect of not being applicable to the whole Empire. In the eyes of the Greeks it was flagrant injustice towards them, on the part of their European co-religionists, to leave them "out in the cold," and hence the representatives of all the Christians who were not Slavs cordially supported the Grand Council in Constantinople in refusing to concede to the demands of the Conference. As the antipathy of the Greek for the Slav is far stronger than it is for the Osmanli, and as the Hellenic Patriarch of the Greek Church hates the Slav Exarch of the same Church far more than he does the Sheik ul Islam, the notion that this detested branch of his Church should be under the special favor and patronage of Europe filled him with holy rage, a sentiment which was not unnaturally shared in by his spiritual brother the patriarch of the Armenian Church,* and by the chief Rabbi

* Some authorities give the Turkish population at 1,300,000, but this includes those of mixed blood. The pure Osmanlis do not probably much exceed more than half that number.

"The Christians," says the "Times" correspondent, writing from Constantinople during the Conference, "urged by their priests, seem to forget all their ill-will to their Mahometan oppressors in their still more intense hatred of their Christian fellow-sufferers."

of the Jews. Had the Porte accepted the proposals of the Powers, they might, had they been so minded, have proved their worthlessness, and obtained a bloody and fearful revenge, by simply letting the Greek populations of Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, and Thessaly loose upon the already exhausted Slavs of the Northern provinces, while the Roman Catholic tribes of Albania, being of a different religion, might have joined impartially whichever side they thought best in their own interest.

Any scheme, then, of a reformed administration for Turkey to be effectual must be universal, in Europe at all events, but an effectual scheme means one of which the entire responsibility must rest upon those charged with its execution. In other words, it means depriving the Turkish government of all real authority, while leaving it the shadow, and placing the actual government of the whole country in the hands of a European commission. It was quite evident that this was the logical result of the proposals of the Powers, and that to yield at all would be to let in the thin end of the wedge by means of which the entire Turkish Empire was to be split to pieces. Fortunately for the Powers, the Porte refused to yield, and those of them who have a better idea now of the complications of the administrative problem in Turkey than they had a year ago, have an opportunity, if they are wise enough to avail themselves of it, of retiring from the arena of Oriental politics until they see their chance of interfering, not in favor of any particular Christian, which only places them in a false position, but openly and straightforwardly and without any hollow religious profession in their own special interests. This is the simple policy which Prince Bismarck has given us from the first to understand that he intends to pursue.

Meantime, out of deference to the prejudices with which he has had to contend, the Turkish Prime Minister has introduced a constitution which, if it fails as an administrative measure, has evidently been a political shot well aimed into the Russian camp. It is, in fact, a challenge to the Russian government to venture itself upon a reform half as liberal. What better answer can Turkey make to Russia as a guaranty of good faith in the direction of liberal government, than to promulgate a constitution which the Czar would not dare to introduce into Russia? This enables Turkey to say that if Russia now goes to war it will be to

check the spread of liberal institutions. "It is very plain," says the *Vakyyat*, or "News" of Constantinople, "that to prevent the rise of a constitutional state on the Russian borders, Russian diplomacy will not allow us to carry out our designs." This is turning the tables with a vengeance, but I do not think Russian diplomacy will be required to make the new Turkish Constitution practically a failure. If the solution of the problem is not to be found in the interference of foreign Powers, it is quite as little likely to be found in an adaptation of the most advanced institutions of people educated to work them to the ignorant and heterogeneous population of Turkey.

One of the favorite theories of the Christian public is that the evils which they seek to remedy in Turkey arise entirely from the corruption and tyranny of the Turkish administration, and if this could be reformed they assume that a system might be introduced which would be easy of application. Hence, whenever an opportunity occurs, Europe kindly furnishes a system, such, for instance, as the Hatti Houmayoum, which was the result of the Crimean War, and which to those acquainted with the country was a manifestly impracticable measure of reform, no matter how perfect the officials who were charged to put it into operation might have been; the plan proposed in the Andrassy note the other day was even more futile, and why the British government did not refuse to assent to it, on the same ground that it refused to assent to the Berlin memorandum, it is difficult to conceive. At the same time no one can deny, who has lived in Turkey, that the system of government is more inefficient and backward than any which exists in Europe, and that, excepting possibly in Russia, there is no country where the petty officials are more oppressive and corrupt. The question is whether, given the existing conditions, the most enlightened government and the purest bureaucracy could deal with them. First, it should be remembered that any scheme which does not embrace the Asiatic as well as the European dominions of the Sultan, would give rise to jealousies and complications which would in the end lead to new troubles; but as Europe has thought fit to patronize exclusively the Christians in Europe, I will confine myself to the difficulties attending reform in European Turkey. We find here the following races and religions: (1) the

Slavs, who are in religion Greek, Catholic, and Mahometan; (2) the Hellenes, who are Greek with a few Catholics; (3) the Latin tribes in Albania who are Catholic, together with Albanians of the same region who are Greek, Mahometan, and Catholic; (4) the Bulgars, who are Greek, Catholic, and Mahometan; (5) the Armenians, who are Gregorians and Catholics, the latter subdivided into Hassounites and Anti-Hassounites; (6) the Koutzo Wallacks, who are of Gypsy Wallachian origin, and are of the Greek Church; (7) the Osmanlis, who are Mahometans; (8) the Jews; (9) the Tartars, exiles from the Crimea, Mahometans; (10) the Circassians, exiles from Circassia, Mahometans; and (11) ordinary Gypsies.

These eleven races hate each other on religious grounds in the following directions. The Catholic and Greek Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovine are in hot and constant antagonism; the Mahometan Slav of the same provinces dislikes and despises both. The same kind of antagonism exists in Bulgaria, but the most inveterate hatred is that which is felt by the Hellenes for the Slav, and *vice versa*. This is political as well as religious, and arises from the latent feeling that, should the Christian ever get the upper hand in Turkey in Europe, the real struggle for supremacy will be between these two races. The Hellenes entertain an antipathy for Catholics and Mahometans wherever they are found, second only to their hatred of the Slav. Wherever the Catholics are numerous enough, they indulge chiefly in persecution of the Greeks and Gregorian Armenians, naturally, also, abhorring the Mahometan. An intense feeling of bitterness exists between the Gregorian Armenians, who own allegiance to the Patriarch at Etzmiazin, and the Catholic Armenians; also between the Hassounites and Anti-Hassounites. Christians of all these denominations oppress the Jews whenever they get a chance, and are cordially detested by the latter in return. The Gypsies wander about with their hands, in their small way, against every man. The Circassians are by no means quiet neighbors; and the Mahometans, with tolerable impartiality, oppress everybody.

In Constantinople itself, there are even ecclesiastical chiefs of rival religious sects, exercising special jurisdiction over their co-religionists in questions of civil and religious rights, many of them enjoying the protection of the representatives of Christian

Powers, who are used for political purposes, and who are able to put pressure on the Central Government in their conflicting interests.

There are altogether nineteen European consular jurisdictions in Turkey, each consul exercising political and civil functions quite unknown in other European countries. They are all representatives of Christian Powers, and sympathize with and protect their co-religionists indirectly, in accordance with the political views of their respective countries. Thus France and Austria, when Austria was anti-Russian, protected the Catholic against the Greek; before the war Austria has had political reasons, which have since ceased to exist, for a *rapprochement* toward Russia, and protected the Slav in concert with Russia. An act of this kind was the prime cause of the last outbreak in Herzegovine, in the autumn of 1874, which has given rise to the Eastern question in its present shape. Hence every town in Turkey in which there is a group of foreign consuls is a hotbed of intrigue, and frequently the influence wielded by these gentlemen exceeds that of the Turkish official. I was very much struck with this some years ago at Scutari in Albania, when I paid a visit to the late Bibdodo Pasha, chief of the Miridits, a Latin Catholic tribe, and found French influence paramount. Turkey is thus in fact the touchstone of Europe. Whenever there is a change in the relations of any two European Powers, Turkey instantly vibrates to it. When any two powers are opposed to each other in politics it is their battle-ground, and they foment religious animosities with the view of obtaining diplomatic triumphs; when they are reconciled, it is always to defeat some new combination on the part of the other Christian Powers. These are practically divided into two camps, one presided over by England, the other by Russia. The effort of the Russian camp has been to induce the representatives of other Powers to aid her in rendering all government in Turkey impossible, which, as I have shown, considering the materials there are to work upon, is an easy task. The effort of England has always hitherto been to support the Turkish official in his endeavor to overcome the difficulties thrown in his way by the representatives of the Powers bent on impeding the machinery of the government, and destroying the prestige of the central authority. So long as the efforts of Russia are persistently directed to this one object, so long as a political and religious prop-

aganda subsidized from without, is maintained for the express purpose of encouraging Christian insurrections, and so long as other Powers, to serve political ends, actively support or passively countenance, on the part of Turkey's greatest enemy, machinations aimed at the disintegration of the Empire, any scheme of reform will prove inoperative.

A good illustration of this is furnished by a report recently published by Monsieur Aksakoff, in which he gives an account of the work now being carried on by some of these Slavonic Committees, prefacing his remarks by saying that the time has not yet come "for Russia [i. e. the people of Russia] to resign into the hands of the state this great and important work." "The society," he remarks, "or rather the people, carry on a war in the persons of her sons (I say sons, not hirelings) at their own expense, in a country which, though bound to ours by strong ties of relationship, is not known to the masses, and has been, up till now, rarely spoken of, and without any consideration of selfishly material or practical purposes, but on a question of principle or sentiment"; and he goes on to say: "For the Russian there is no enemy more popular than the Turk; . . . the Russian people will not abandon the work which it has begun, of that we may be sure." This latter assertion is just what renders all attempts at reform in Turkey so hopeless. If the Turk is always to be hated as their most "popular enemy" by those wishing to see him govern better, it is evident that his most honest efforts must be rendered futile. Surely, the more benighted the Turk is in his administrative ideas the more he requires the assistance of enlightened nations. But instead of this he has been subjected to a pressure, on the part of Europe, since the Crimean War, by no means calculated to increase his love for the Christian. In 1858 the Danubian Principalities were practically detached from the Empire, and placed under the collective guaranty of European powers. In 1860 the Sultan was forced by Europe to permit the occupation of Syria by a French army. In 1862 he was compelled to hand over the fortress of Belgrade to the Servians. In 1866 special privileges were extorted from him for the Cretans. In 1870 the Khedive of Egypt was supported in his pretensions against the Sovereign Power. All these concessions were the consequence, in the first instance, of intrigues on the part of Christian Powers, which produced either insurrections or compli-

cations resulting in a diminution of the territory or authority of the Sultan, and are so many acts of the programme which has for its object the ultimate dissolution of his Empire. No government can successfully inaugurate reforms, especially amongst an ignorant and heterogeneous population divided internally, unless it is a strong government, and no government can be a strong government while it is actively undergoing a process of decomposition forced upon it from without. If therefore the problem of good government in Turkey seems insoluble, it is not because the officials are corrupt, — their reform would not be hopeless, — not because the elements of which the population is composed are too conflicting ever to be harmonized, though the task might well seem desperate, — but because it is impossible ever to reform those officials or to harmonize those elements in the presence of the tremendous influences of race and religion which certain Christian Powers can bring to bear to thwart all reform and destroy all harmony.

Had Russia been sincere in her desire to ameliorate the condition of the Christian Slavs in Turkey, there were several occasions, even within the last six months, where her influence might have been exercised in such a manner as to stop the effusion of blood, and avert the crisis which now threatens to overwhelm them with disaster. When all Europe agreed to the Andrassy note, and the Porte accepted the provisions which it contained, guaranteeing reform, the insurgents in Bosnia and Herzegovine were encouraged by Russia to continue the struggle, though there can be little doubt that they would now thankfully accept the conditions which were then proposed the rejection of which at the time was due to Muscovite instigation. Again, in September last, England, in response to an appeal from Prince Milan, procured a suspension of hostilities for ten days, and Lord Derby proposed to open negotiations with the Porte on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum* for Servia and Montenegro, and administrative autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovine. Turkey, under the strong pressure of England and to her own great military detriment, agreed to a further extension of hostilities; but all the while Russian volunteers were pouring into Servia, and Russian influence was counteracting all pacific counsels, until finally Prince Milan, much to the displeasure of the British government, rejected the proposal, on the

plea that his interests would suffer from any arrangement which was not preceded by a regular armistice, and recommenced the war. How thankful would he be to accept these conditions now! When only a month later Turkey proposed a six months' armistice, to which England, France, Austria, and Italy agreed, Prince Gortschakoff telegraphed from Livadia, that Russia could not ask Servia to accept so long an armistice, because the Principality could not keep its army on a war-footing for such a length of time without putting too severe a strain upon its resources. Thus the war was continued till the Servian army was destroyed, and the consequences were far more disastrous to Servia than any which could have resulted from the armistice proposed by Turkey. At last this unhappy Principality is waking up to the painful consciousness that the influence of that Power which professed the warmest sympathy for her has been most fatal to her real interests.

The "Times" correspondent at Belgrade, who cannot be accused of Turkish sympathies, bears the following testimony to this fact:—"The Servian peasant has conceived a worse hatred against the Russian brother than he had against the Moslem oppressor, of whom he knew but very little. This feeling of dislike has extended backward and upward, until it has reached the highest circles of Servian citizens; and if a vote were taken to-day for Russian or Turkish domination, the latter would have an immense majority." Before many months are over there will not be a Christian peasant in all Turkey who will not share in the hatred which Servia now feels for Russia, and he will extend it to all his co-religionists in Europe, to whose Christian and most injudicious intervention in his behalf all the woes and miseries in store for him are mainly due.

Unfortunately the Christian races in Turkey are not alone in having been the dupes of Russia; the Christian Powers of Europe have been no less deceived by the religious prettexts which have been put forward by that Power to justify her insidious policy of aggression upon the Ottoman Empire. It cannot be too earnestly pressed upon those powers who are sincere in their desire of ameliorating the condition of its European provinces, that this can only be achieved by the entire abandonment of that policy which has fos-

* See "Times," January 19, 1877.

tered the animosities of race and religion, for one in which all such invidious distinctions should be ignored, and which should be universally applicable to all races, all religions, and all provinces. Such a policy should have for its object, first, the establishment of a sound and general system of national education; second, it should provide for the introduction into the army of the non-Musulman population; third, it should initiate a radical reform in the judiciary; fourth, it should seek to improve the financial administration of the Empire; and, fifth, it should aim at developing its commercial and agricultural resources by means of public works and improved means of communication. Turkey has often applied for instructors in these various departments, but unfortunately, with a few honorable exceptions, the agents who have been sent by various Powers have either proved grossly incompetent, or, if they possessed ability, have been used by the representatives of those powers for purposes of political and diplomatic intrigue. The effect has been to lower the prestige of Europe in the eyes of the Turk, and to introduce confusion instead of reform. So far the responsibility of failure has rested quite as much with the Christian as with the Moslem, and this is likely to be the case so long as European agents charged with these high functions, from the ambassador to the most subordinate emissary, place their own private or national ambitions above the interests of the country they profess to serve. If the Turk is as backward and as barbarous as he is said to be, he cannot accomplish reforms which it has taken homogeneous and civilized nations centuries to achieve, without the most strenuous and disinterested assistance, and the most indulgent treatment on the part of those nations. If he is not so, then their right to interfere in his internal affairs vanishes. Under no circumstances does extermination by the sword, with which he is now threatened, seem to be either the proper or the Christian remedy.

In conclusion, I would venture to assert that in the interests of humanity the policy attempted by the Christian Powers so far has been the least merciful one to pursue. Had they succeeded in forcibly imposing their guaranties upon the Porte, they would have fatally weakened the central authority, and opened the door to an infinite amount of intrigue and quarrelling among the representatives of the different Powers composing the Commission. The

hostile feelings which the various races of different religions now entertain towards each other would have become still more exacerbated under foreign pressure, things generally would be rendered more chaotic, and the remedy prove worse than the disease. Should one or more Powers combined now undertake an intervention by force, the immediate result to the Christian races will be most disastrous, for their homes will become the battle-field. Should the Turks be defeated and the final problem of the government of these provinces fall to others, it is impossible to conceive how it can be solved excepting after wars in which the hatreds of these rival races and religions will find their vent. The Mahometans, who are of the same races as the Christians, will certainly never submit to be governed by their own peasantry, excepting after a furious resistance. Should these Christian serfs, who are even more uncivilized than their Mahometan masters, be victorious, the oppressed will become the more bitter oppressors, while they will still have rivals among the other Christian races for supremacy, unless, indeed, the strong hand of Russia be spread over them, which of all possible catastrophes is the one they most dread.

Unfortunately, those who have been mainly instrumental in England in bringing matters to their present crisis do not seem yet to realize the harm that has been done, or the still greater evils that are to follow from a persistence in the policy, if policy it can be called, which they have forced upon the country. The sacrifice has already been made to Russia of everything that was gained during the Crimean War, for the Treaty of Paris has virtually become a dead letter, but the problem of good government for the Christian Slav is as far from solution as ever. In 1827 England expended blood and treasure for the sake of the Christian against the Turk. In 1854 she embarked in a sanguinary and costly war for the sake of the Turk against the Christian. In 1877 the Liberal party proposes to co-operate in a crusade on behalf of the Christian against the Turk, in alliance with a people almost as barbarous and as fanatical as their Moslem enemy. As upon this occasion all purely political considerations have been excluded from the question, the war, if war there be, will be based on humanitarian and religious grounds. Experience has unhappily proved that the most terrible and sanguinary of all wars are those which have had for their justification the highest and holiest interests of humanity,

but never before in the history of such struggles could the fanaticism by which they were inspired avail itself of the present enginery of war. Never before, since the foundation of Christianity, have the soldiers of the Cross been formed into such gigantic armies, or been so splendidly trained, or supplied with such ingenious contrivances for the wholesale destruction of their fellow-creatures professing other religions; never before could the soldiers of the Crescent be summoned by telegraph from the most distant ends of the earth, and transported by railway and steamer to the battle-fields on which they were to die for their faith.

The nineteenth century of Christian civilization has reserved for us the singular spectacle of Europe converted into an armed camp, and the nations of Christendom endeavoring to forget the feelings of jealousy, hatred, and distrust by which they are usually animated, in the effort to unite upon a common basis of race prejudice and of religious intolerance. Should the war which now appears impending between Russia and Turkey really break out, it is impossible to foresee the magnitude of the disasters which may follow in its train, or the extent over which they may spread. That forty millions of Mahometans in India will escape the influence of such a conflagration, and remain perfectly passive, is confidently believed in England; but indications are not wanting, both in that country and Algeria, to prove that the Mussulman population is keenly alive to the progress of events in Turkey, and the more formidable the Christian coalition in Europe becomes, the more readily will one hundred and eighty millions of Moslems combine to meet it. Fortunately European nations are pausing, as the vast proportions which such a struggle might take are becoming more clearly defined. There are disturbing socialistic elements in the midst of them which cannot be ignored, and there are classes in almost every Christian country ready to seize the opportunity for which they have long been watching, to rise also in the interests of humanity against those whom they consider as unjust and oppressive as the Turk.

Thus it has become apparent that if the Christian nations of Europe are now shrinking from the anachronism of a bloody crusade against Islamism, their reluctance to precipitate such a catastrophe does not spring from the moral progress which they have made, or from that broader and purer love for humanity which

should seek to shield it from such a calamity, but is suggested rather by their own conflicting interests, by their mutual jealousies and rivalries, by their dread of domestic revolutions which would be social and anti-Christian in their tendencies, and by the fear that the moral forces at their disposal may not be sufficiently cohesive to cope with those wielded by their Moslem adversaries, who will find in a religious war their strongest bond of union, and in the summons to a Djehad their surest guaranty against internal revolt.

LAURENCE OLIPHANT.

ART. IV. — WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD.*

THE common belief that no man can be wholly trusted when he writes the story of his own life is well founded. Like most of the opinions which men hold of mankind, it comes less from experience of others than from knowledge of ourselves. We feel, each and all of us, that we ourselves could not be trusted to give the world, or even our best friends, a simple, full, unbiassed revelation of our lives, inner and outer. We know, most of us, that in the telling of any incident of daily life of which we have been a part, the temptation, more or less strong or weak, arises to show ourselves at the best consistent with truth, to keep back anything that might make against us, and to give a little glow of color to what would else be a too cold and simple story. Few men are able to withstand this temptation wholly; still fewer do not know it at all. But there are men who do not know it; men to whom self is out of mind, and before whose eyes truth always stands, their only guide, almost their only God. Such men, however, very rarely write their own biographies. For such men have rarely, we might say never, anything to say about themselves that the world would care to hear, or even that their own vanity might suggest that the world would wish to know,—a fact very significant and not wholly admirable, but rather derogatory to

* *Autobiography of William H. Seward from 1801 to 1834. With a Memoir of his Life and Selections from his Letters from 1831 to 1846.* By FREDERICK W. SEWARD. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 8vo. pp. 822.